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ABSTRACT 
The issue of confidence factors in Knowledge Based Systems has become 
increasingly important and Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory has become 
increasingly popular as a basis for these factors. This paper discusses 
the need for an empirical interpretation of any theory of confidence 
factors applied to Knowledge Based Systems and describes an empirical 
interpretation of DS theory suggesting that the theory-has been 
seriously misinterpreted. For the essentially syntactic DS theory, the 
empirical model developed is based on the semantics of sample spaces. 
This model is used to show that, if belief functions are based on 
reasonably accurate sampling or observation of a sample space, then 
the beliefs and upper probabilities as computed according to OS theory 
cannot be interpreted as frequency ratios. Since a number of proposed 
applications of OS theory use belief functions in situations with 
statistically derived evidence and seem to appeal to statistical intui­
tion to provide an interpretation of the results, it is likely that OS 
theory has often been misapplied. Examples are cited. 
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CONFIDENCE FACTORS, EMP IRICISM 
AND 
THE DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY OF EVIDENCE 
The issue of confidence factors in Knowledge Based Systems has 
become increasingly important and Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory has 
become increasingly popular as a basis for these factors. This 
paper discusses the need for an empirical in te r pretation of any 
theory of confidence factors applied to Knowledge Based Systems 
and describes an empirical interpretation of DS theory suggesting 
that the theory has been extensively misinterpreted. For the 
essentially syntactic DS theory, a model is developed based on 
sample spaces, the traditional semantic model of probability 
theory. This model is used to show that, if belief function� are 
based on reasonably accurate sampling or observation of a sample 
space, then the beliefs and upper probabilities as computed 
according to DS theory cannot be interpreted as frequency ratios. 
Since many proposed applications of DS theory use belief functions 
in situations with statistically derived evidence [Wesley] and 
seem to appeal to statistical intuition to provide an 
interpretation of the results [Garvey] , it may argued that DS 
theory has often been misapplied. 
The success of the scientific approach is generally attributed by 
philosophers such as Popper to its insistence on empirical 
verification of theories [Davis] . Stated from a different point of 
view, theories which do not make empirically verifiable 
predictions about reality are not scientific. When one builds 
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Knowledge Based Systems f or applications and includes the use of 
confidence factors, these confidence factors presumably are 
present to make some statement about the real world. If such 
Knowledge Based Systems are to be considered scientific, we must 
face the problem of empirically testing these statements. 
Arguments advanced in support of the various theories of 
confidence factors are almost never empirically testable. Some 
arguments often presented in favor of the DS theory are that the 
results are intuitively appealing, and that ranges of confidence 
are certainly better than point estimates [Shafer] . An argument 
often presented in favor the Fuzzy Sets is that humans are 
satisf ied with the quantitative values produced, and that the 
theory ''seems to work" [Zadeh '84] . 
The point of view taken here is that such arguments are sufficient 
to motivate further investigation into the merits of the these 
theories but are not sufficient to justify them as a basis for 
wholesale practical application, that ranges of confidence f actors 
are useless if they have no empirically testable meaning, and 
that "seeming to work" arguments are subject to the Perceptron 
fallacy. 
An attempt to provide an empirically testable semantic 
interpretation of DS is described in the remainder of this paper. 
The rather surprising result of this attempt is strong support for 
the conjecture that DS theory cannot, in principle, be 
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empirically interpreted as calculus applicable to sample spaces, 
if the belief functions arise from the real world in a non-random 
way. Thus, though the numbers produced by this theory are often 
termed probabilites, they are not probabilites in the normal 
meaning employed in the experimental sciences. A connection seems 
likely between this conjecture and Zadeh's [Zadeh] observation 
that Dempster's evidence combination rule requires use of 
probability statements about undefined events. 
The semantic model which provides the empirical basis for 
traditional probability models is the empirically defined sample 
space model, often discussed in terms of balls in an urn. lndeed, 
this model is usually considered an intrinsic part of traditional 
probability theory [Parzen] as developed by Fisher and von Mises. 
Certain aspects of traditional theory were axiomatized by 
Kolmolgorov but these axioms do not capture all aspects of 
traditional theory. In particular, eYent• require no empirical 
definition in the Kolmolgorov theory. Theories such as DS and 
Fuzzy Sets, in general, satisfy the Kolmolgorov axioms but seem to 
lack the semantic interpretation possible with empirical sample 
space models. 
A sample space interpretation of DS is now presented which 
provides a reasonable, meaningful (but of course not the only 
possible) empirical definition of the belief function of the DS 
theory. However, the application of Dempster's rule will be shown 
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to destroy the sample apace intepretation of combined belief 
functions. (We cannot, as yet argue that there is no possible 
sample space interpretation of DS whose meaning can be preserved 
by Dempster's rule, but it is our conjecture that under very 
non-restrictive conditions, that this is indeed the case. ) The 
presentation begins with a brief, considerably simpler, 
interpretation of the Bayesian and Generalized Bayesian [Lemmer] 
inference in terms of sample spaces. This sample space model is 
then expanded to cover the DS theory. 
As a convenient way of discussing sample spaces, consider an urn 
containing a number of balls, each of which is marked with zero or 
more different labels. For example some of the balls may be 
labeled "a", others "b", some may have both marks while others 
have neither. [ These labels may be thought of as binary random 
variables: if label "a" is present, then variable "a" has value 1, 
otherwise it has value zero. ] Assume that when observing the balls 
it is cheaper, in some sense, to check for the presence of some 
labels than others. [If we are restricted to "remote sensing" it 
will be cheaper to determine if the ball is greater than an inch 
in diameter than to determine if it weighs more than an ounce.] An 
experiment in such a model consists of drawing a single ball from 
the urn and observing some of its labels. The problem in classical 
probability theory ia to estimate, before drawing the ball, the 
probability of drawing a ball labeled "a". This probability, under 
appropriate assumptions about how the ball is drawn, ia usually 
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taken to be the fraction of the balls in the urn which are labeled 
''a". This fraction can be determined by counting all the balls in 
the urn, or if this is inf easible, using the techniques of 
Sampling Theory to estimate this fraction. 
The problem in Bayesian probability theory is to estimate, having 
drawn the ball and made an observation about label "a", the 
probability of the ball also being marked with label "b". Under 
Bayes' rule this probability is taken to be the fraction of balls 
having label "b" in that partition of the sample defined by balls 
having label "a". (Again, if the whole sample space is not 
available, techniques of Sampling Theory can be used to f orm 
estimates. ) 
The Generalized Bayesian problem addresses the case where one 
cannot be certain whether or not the label "a" is present. 
Instead, after drawing, one uses observation of the drawn ball to 
revise the previous estimate of the probability of the presence of 
label "a". The result of the observation, in the generalized 
case is that, with probability, p, the label "a" is present. (This 
probability itself could have been estimated based on previous 
samplings and similar observations. ) Under the Generalized Bayes 
Rule, the probability of "b" on the drawn ball is again taken to 
be the fraction of balls with label "b" in a particular partition 
of the sample space. In this case however, the partition is formed 
from the previously discussed "a", "not a" partitions of the 
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sample space. The new partition is constructed by randomly drawing 
balls from the old partitions in such a way that a fraction, p, 
come from the old "a" partition and the remainder from the old 
"not a" partition. 
The major point to be observed here is that Sample Theory, 
Bayesian Theory, and Generalized Bayesian Theory are mathematical 
models of the empirical operations just described. The question to 
be addressed now is "of what empirical operations is Dempster's 
Rule the model?" In particular does it model similar operations on 
balls in an urn? 
To give an empirical sample space interpretation for the belief 
functions of the DS theory, the balls in the urn must be labeled 
differently than just described. This labeling also highlights a 
difference in focus between the two theories:. The Bayesian Theory 
is most suitable for balls which have multiple co-occurring labels 
and for observations which determine the presence or absence of a 
particular label type; the DS theory is most suitable for balls 
which have a single label drawn from a set of possible labels (the 
frame of discernment), and observations which restrict the label 
to some subset of the set of possible labels. 
Imagine balls which have a single "true" label which, in some 
sense is hidden, and multiple other labels which are accessible to 
observation processes which we shall call sensors. The use of 
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these sensors will be to form belief function• empirically. The 
true label is drawn from the mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive set of labels usually termed the frame of discernment 
or "theta". The labels accessible to the various sensors 
correspond to subsets of theta. Thus the true label on a ball 
might be "a" while the label accessible by some particular sensor 
might be "a or b". The label available to some other belief 
forming process might be "a or c". As an example of such a 
labeling process, consider theta to be the set of all sailboats. 
An observation of a particular sailboat in a photograph taken in 
mist with an uncalibrated camera might reveal only that the 
sailboat in question is a catamaran. This is equivalent to 
labeling the observation with the subset of all sailboats, 
{Hobie-Cat,Prindle, • • •  }. 
An experiment in this model consists of drawing a ball and 
assigning a probability range to each possible proposition about 
the true label of the ball. This assignment of ranges is done by 
using Dempster's rule to combine a set of belief functions 
concerning the balls in the urn and the particular ball which was 
drawn. This assignment of ranges is accomplished by applying 
Dempster's rule to a series of belief functions constructed about 
the balls in the urn and the drawn ball. We will now define 
empirical semantics for the belief functions to be combined. 
For each sensor, develop a belief function from the DS urn in the 
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following way: Let the probability mass, m ( T),  associated with 
each subset of theta, T, be the fraction of balls labeled T by the 
particular sensor. Then, if the sensor labeling is accurate, that 
is, if t*, the element of theta which is the "true" label of the 
particular ball, is always an element of the label applied to that 
ball, then the minimum fraction of balls for which t* is an 
element of T is given by 
B (T) • > m(t) 
t� 
(1) 
which is in accord with the DS definition of B el ( T) .  The maximum 
fraction of balls which could have a true label which is an 
element of T is given by 
I 
p* ( T) • > m (U) 
I 
U<theta 
U. int. T I• {) 
I 
• B ( T) + > m (U) 
I 
U<theta 
U.int. (theta - T) !• {) 
(2)  
which is in accord with the DS definition of p* ( T).  Equations ( 1) 
and ( 2 )  follow from the assumption that every sensor labeling is 
accurate. If the sensor labelings are not accurate, we have no 
assurance that ( 1) and (2)  define the minimum and maxim um 
fractions. In fact if the labeling& can be false, we can say 
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nothing about'the possible range of the fractions. rhus, under the 
assumption of accurate sensor labeling, we have an empirical 
def inition of individual belief functions corresponding to the DS 
definition. 
It is generally stated that if belief functions are independent, 
then Dempster's rule, shown in (3) below, is a valid way to 
combine individual belief functions. If the combined belief 
function is to be empirically meaningful, then equations (1) and 
(2) using the probability mass from the combined belief function 
should provide ranges which are true with respect to the balls in 
the urn. 
We will now show that there are labeling processes, independent of 
each other in every practical sense (to be defined) , which give 
·rise to belief f unctions which when combined, do � provide 
ranges accurately describing the original po�ulstion. These 
labeling processes will be seen to be of great practical 
importance, not just of academic interest. We will, however, show 
the converse that given two belief functions, a population can 
alway s be generated which satisfies the combined belief function. 
We will show the former by example, and the latter by providing a 
construction. The construction provides insight as to why 
population parameters cannot be described by combined belief 
f unctions developed from accurate sensors and provides a 
connection to the claims of Zadeh mentioned above. 
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Consider an urn containing barls whose true labels are exactly one 
of the labels from the the set (a,b,c}. To provide intuition 
concerning the action of sensors, assume that balls which ate 
labeled "a" are liaht in weight while balls labeled either "b" or 
"c" are heavy. Assume also that balls labeled either "a" or "b" 
are red in color while balls labeled "c" are blue. Thus two 
sensors, one of which can classify weight and the other which can 
classify color can each be thought of as a process for empirically 
determining belief functions. Sensor 1 can be thought of as 
labeling balls, truly labeled, "a" with a label tl•a, 
and balls, truly labeled "b" or "c", with a label tl•b+c (read "b" 
or "c") .  Likewise sensor 2 provides either t2•a+b or t2•c. If 
p(a), p(b), and p(c) represent the actual fraction of balls having 
true labels "a", "b", and "c" respectively, then the two sensor 
systems could be used to empirically determine the belief 
functions illustrated in Table 1. 
Sensor ! Sensor 2 
ml(a) • p(a) m2(a+b) • p(a+b) 
• p(a) + p(b) 
ml(b+c) • p(b+c) 
• p(b) + p(c) m2(c) • p(c) 
Table 1: Two Belief Functions 
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It can readily be seen that the labeling processes are independent 
when conditioned by the value of the true label but are not 
unconditionally independent. This is exactly as would be desired 
in real applications since unconditional independence would imply 
a non-zero probability of inconsistent labeling by the two 
sensors, implying one or both sensors applied labels of which the 
true label was not an element. In the real world one presumably 
always strives to have error free sensors, and would certainly 
hope to have sensors whose actual error rate is less than that 
required to produce unconditionally independent labeling. 
We now examine the belief function obtained by using Dempster's 
rule, (3), to combine the two belief functions shown in Table 1. 
1 
m3(T) • -
k 
where 
' 
-. 
I 
>[ml(T) m2(U) + ml(U) m2(T)] - ml(T) m2(T) 
I 
T<U<theta 
I 
k • 1 - > ml(x) m2(y) 
I 
x<theta y<theta 
x.int.y • {} 
17 1 
(3) 
Applying ( 3) to our example where theta •{a, b,c} yields 
ml(a) m2(a+b) 
p(a) <• B(a) • m3(a) ·----- (4) 
1 - ml(a)m2(c) 
where th� inequality expresses the claim we are investigating. The 
first equality is from �) and the second equality is from (3). 
Substituting the empirical belief values from Table 1 gives 
p(a) p(a+b) 
p(a) <• ----
1 - p(a)p(c) (5) 
Since a and b are mutually exclusive events, we may substitute 
p(a)+p(b) for p(a+b). The elements of the frame of disceinment are 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive so we may 
substitute 1-p(c) for p(a)+p(b). Making these substitutions and 
dividing through by p(a) produces 
1 - p(c) 
1 <· 
----· 
1 - p(a)p(c) 
(6) 
Since p(a), p(b), and p(c) must all be positive and recalling that 
we divided through by p(a), we can see that that (6)  holds only if 
p(c) is 0. If it is not, then the belief function resulting from 
the application of Dempster's rule does not correctly bound the 
value of p(a )  in the population. Note that if p(c) is 0, then the 
labeling processes which produced the belief functions in Table 1 
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are unconditionally as well as conditionally independent. 
The first major point is that accurate labeling processes are 
never unconditionally independent except in trivial cases. By an 
accurate labeling process we mean a process which does not assign 
a label which is inconsistent with the true label. In general, 
such inconsistent labelings must occur if the labeling processes 
are unconditionally independent. Indeed the normalizing factor in 
equation (3) can, in our semantic model, be interpreted as one 
minus the probability of inconsistent labeling, assuming 
unconditionally independent labeling processes. We can conclude 
that DS is not appropriate for dealing with sensors which provide 
accurate labelings. 
The second major point is that, in our empirical interpretation, 
the estimation of a belief function is no different, in principle, 
than the estimation of a Bayesian prior. Both are obtained either 
by examining the entire population or by using Sampling Theory (or 
similar approaches) to estimate parameters of the entire 
population. 
We now turn our attention to constructing a population which is 
consistent with Dempster's combination of belief functions. 
Before, we imagined that the balls in the urn had true labels 
initially and were further labeled by sensors which had access to 
some information about the true labels. Now we assume that the 
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balls have no true labeling at the beginning and that a true 
labeling will be generated only after the combined belief function 
. 
is determined. We apply our sensor labeling process as follows: 
Allow sensor 1 to randomly label each ball but in such a way that 
the total fraction of balls receiving a label, Tl•x, is equal to 
ml ( x ) ·. (Ther·e is no restriction on Bell other than that the ml (x) 
be non-negative and sum to one over all subsets of theta.) Allow 
sensor 2 to label the balls in a simila r  random fashion, .taking 
special care that second labeling is independent of the first (i.e 
p({T2•y)/{Tl-x})•p({T2-y))•m2(y)). Now examine each ball and 
assign it a tr ue label from the set x intersect y. If the 
intersection is empty discard the ball. Note that discarding these 
balls is the semantic equivalent of the normalization operation in 
equation (3) . The result will be a population of balls such that 
equations (2) and (3) accurately describe the range of true 
probabilities which might occur in the population. The actual 
probabilities of course are determined by how·the true label is 
chosen from the intersection of x and y. The minimum probability 
is achieved for p (t) if t is never chosen as the true label unless 
x .int. y • {t) and the maximum for p(t) is achieved if t is 
always chosen as the true label if it is an element of x.int.y. 
Note, however that the ranges are not independent. For example, 
no� population exists in which all minima are achieved 
simultaneously. 
The two labeling methods can be viewed in the following way. In 
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the first labeling method, that in which a pre-existing population 
is examined, the sensors had access to some partial knowledge 
concerning the true label of the balls. These true labels are 
conceived of as existing before and independently of the sensing 
process. In the second method, that of constructing a 
population, the sensors acted independently of each other and 
with no knowledge of the true label. True labels can be assigned 
only after the final belief is formed. Thus in dealing with a 
sample space we are led to a paradox: If we accurately observe the 
population, we cannot use Dempster's rule: if we use Dempster's 
rule we must form our beliefs without studying the population. 
Of course there may exist other semantic models of the 
Dempster-Shafer theory which avoid the problems and paradox 
described above. But until such models are developed, it is our 
conclusion that Dempster's rule is not applicable to situations 
which can be modeled by sample spaces in whic� the sample points 
have "true" labels independent of the sensing process. While the 
DS method produces ranges of belief rather than point estimates, 
these ranges will not be related to frequencies of occurrence in 
meaningful situations. Thus these ranges cannot be used as input 
to decision theoretic processes and cannot be used, for example, 
to estimate expected utility. It appears to be an open question as 
to how decisions should be made, based on the outputs of DS 
calculations, in any situation in which frequencies of occurrence, 
predicted error rates, etc. are of concern. 
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